Documented: Yes
A current primary source explicitly supports the positive value for the stated scope. The source, scope and verification date stay attached to the field.
AgentenTrust 2.0
Direct answer: AgentenTrust 2.0 is AgentenCode’s field-level evidence layer for privacy, security, human control and auditability. It does not award compliance scores. It shows what a primary source actually documents, for which scope, and what remains Unknown.
Current evidence base
Coverage is measured across 130 agent profiles. 115 profiles currently contain at least one trust signal. A missing signal remains Unknown; it is never silently converted into “No”.
If a profile shows “0 of 10 documented” for human control, it means AgentenCode has no field-level public evidence for those ten controls in the current dataset. It does not mean the product has no human-control features.
Four evidence pillars
Data residency, customer-data training, retention, DPA availability, subprocessors and processing scope. These fields help structure GDPR due diligence without turning one feature into a compliance claim.
Encryption, SSO, SCIM, RBAC, custom roles, customer-managed keys, SOC 2 evidence and credential handling. Scope matters: enterprise-only controls remain enterprise-only.
Human approval, oversight, action and tool permissions, policy controls, delegation limits, kill switch and rollback. These controls describe documented product mechanisms, not the adequacy of a specific deployment.
Audit logs, APIs, SIEM export, observability, tracing, action-level records and activity history. A documented log is only useful when its scope and retention fit the real workflow.
Evidence states
A current primary source explicitly supports the positive value for the stated scope. The source, scope and verification date stay attached to the field.
A negative value is stored only when a reliable primary source explicitly documents non-availability, a prohibition or another negative state. Absence of documentation is not enough.
No sufficiently specific public evidence is stored for the field. Unknown is an evidence gap, not a product judgment. It should trigger a due-diligence question, not a negative score.
Some controls use a value instead of yes/no, such as a region or retention period. The value remains bound to the exact source and scope in which it was documented.
Scope before certainty
A trust statement is only as useful as its scope. An enterprise control documented for a hosted cloud session cannot automatically be inherited by a local client, a different plan or another product from the same vendor. AgentenTrust therefore stores scope strings next to the value and source.
If SAML SSO is documented only for an Enterprise plan, the profile may show that control as documented for the enterprise scope. AgentenCode does not silently claim the same control for every free, personal or developer surface.
A regional hosting statement does not by itself prove GDPR compliance, lawful transfer mechanisms or the location of every subprocess. It is one evidence field in a wider assessment.
How evidence enters the system
EU context
Controls can be mapped to topics such as logging, human oversight, transparency, robustness and cybersecurity. The mapping helps teams identify relevant evidence. It does not determine whether a legal obligation applies to a specific organization or use case.
Privacy controls structure questions around processing scope, residency, retention, DPAs, subprocessors and technical security. No single field establishes GDPR compliance or the legality of a particular transfer.
Decision workflow
Start with the controls that matter for the workflow: for example SSO, audit logs, human approval, data residency or a DPA.
Use Agent Check or an individual profile to see which requirements are documented, explicitly negative or Unknown.
Confirm that the documented plan, region and deployment model match the system you actually intend to buy or deploy.
Turn Unknown fields into vendor questions, contract checks or pilot tests instead of treating them as failures.
Machine-readable layer
AgentenCode publishes the normalized control definitions and the current public governance dataset so developers and AI systems can resolve the same fields shown in the interface.
Defines control paths, labels, value types, search terms and legal-context mappings.
Contains the current documented signals per agent with value, scope, verification date and primary-source reference.
36-control catalog
The catalog lists the normalized fields AgentenCode uses consistently across providers and agents. A control existing in the schema does not mean that every agent has a documented value for it.
privacy.residency.availableWhether the provider publicly documents data residency for the relevant product or plan scope.
Legal context: GDPR Art. 5privacy.residency.customer_region_selectableWhether customers can select a documented processing or hosting region for the relevant scope.
Legal context: GDPR Art. 5privacy.residency.regionWhich region or regions are explicitly named by the primary source.
Legal context: GDPR Art. 5privacy.training.customer_dataWhether the primary source explicitly says customer data is or is not used for model training.
Legal context: GDPR Art. 5privacy.retention.policyDocumented retention or deletion logic for relevant customer or product data.
Legal context: GDPR Art. 5privacy.dpa.availableWhether a Data Processing Agreement is publicly documented for the relevant scope.
Legal context: GDPR Art. 28privacy.subprocessors.list_availableWhether the provider publishes a current list of subprocessors for the relevant scope.
Legal context: GDPR Art. 28privacy.processing.scopeThe product, plan, region or deployment scope to which a privacy or processing statement actually applies.
Legal context: GDPR Art. 5, GDPR Art. 28security.encryption.at_restDocumented encryption of stored data within the stated product scope.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 15, GDPR Art. 32security.encryption.in_transitDocumented encryption for data in transit.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 15, GDPR Art. 32security.customer_managed_keyWhether customer-managed encryption keys or BYOK are documented.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 15, GDPR Art. 32security.soc2_type2Whether SOC 2 Type II coverage is publicly documented for the relevant product scope.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 15, GDPR Art. 32governance.sso.samlDocumented support for SAML single sign-on.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 15, GDPR Art. 32governance.sso.oidcDocumented support for OIDC single sign-on.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 15, GDPR Art. 32governance.scimDocumented support for SCIM provisioning.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 15, GDPR Art. 32governance.rbacDocumented role-based access control.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 15, GDPR Art. 32governance.custom_rolesDocumented custom or granular administrative roles.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 15, GDPR Art. 32security.secrets.credential_handlingDocumented handling of secrets, tokens or credentials in the relevant agent or platform scope.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 15, GDPR Art. 32governance.human_approvalDocumented human approval inside an agentic workflow.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 14governance.approval.pre_actionDocumented approval before a consequential or sensitive action is executed.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 14governance.human_oversightDocumented mechanisms for human oversight of agent behavior.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 14governance.permission_controlsDocumented permission controls for agents or workflows.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 14governance.policy_controlsDocumented policy controls that constrain agents or actions.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 14governance.tool_permissionsDocumented controls over which tools an agent may use.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 14governance.action_permissionsDocumented controls over which external actions an agent may execute.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 14governance.delegation_controlsDocumented limits on delegation to other agents or components.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 14governance.kill_switchDocumented ability to stop or disable agentic execution.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 14governance.rollbackDocumented rollback or recovery after agent actions.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 14governance.audit_logs.availableWhether audit or compliance logs are publicly documented.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 12governance.audit_logs.retention_daysDocumented retention period for audit or compliance logs.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 12governance.audit_logs.apiWhether audit logs can be retrieved programmatically through an API.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 12governance.audit_logs.siem_exportWhether export or integration with SIEM systems is documented.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 12observability.availableWhether observability or monitoring capabilities are documented.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 12observability.tracingWhether execution traces are documented for agentic runs.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 12governance.audit_logs.action_levelWhether individual agent actions can be traced at audit level.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 12governance.activity_history.availableWhether an activity or execution history is documented for relevant agent actions.
Legal context: EU AI Act Art. 12Reading coverage correctly
The number of documented controls is therefore not a ranking. What matters is which fields are evidenced for the intended deployment. Claude Code currently has 9 of 36 controls documented, concentrated in Security & access and Auditability. Microsoft Copilot Studio also has 9 of 36, but the evidence is distributed across privacy, security, human control and traceability. Salesforce Agentforce also has 9 of 36 with yet another distribution. The same total can therefore describe three different trust-evidence profiles.
9 of 36 documented: 0 privacy, 6 security, 0 human control, 3 trace. This does not mean privacy or human-control mechanisms are absent; it shows where AgentenCode currently stores field-level public evidence.
Review trust evidence →9 of 36 documented: 2 privacy, 4 security, 1 human control, 2 trace. For procurement, this distribution is often more informative than one aggregate number.
Review trust evidence →9 of 36 documented: 2 privacy, 4 security, 2 human control, 1 trace. Every value remains bound to scope, verification date and primary source.
Review trust evidence →Model limitations
AgentenTrust is not a security audit, penetration test, legal opinion or certification. Public documentation can be incomplete, providers can change features quickly and enterprise contracts may include controls that are not publicly described. A documented field is therefore a reliable starting point for diligence, not the end of the diligence process.
Even “Documented: Yes” does not automatically mean a control is sufficient for every deployment. Audit logs may exist while their retention, granularity or export options remain unsuitable for a particular process. Human approval can be documented while applying only to selected tool calls or interfaces. Scope therefore remains part of every decision.
The strongest use of AgentenTrust combines public evidence with internal diligence: define requirements, inspect documented values, turn Unknowns into vendor questions, verify contracts and plan details, then test realistic workflows inside the organization’s actual permission and data environment.
No. AgentenTrust shows field-level public evidence. Legal compliance depends on the concrete use, organization, contracts and deployment context.
It means no field-level public evidence is stored for those ten controls in the current dataset. It does not mean the product lacks all ten capabilities.
Because missing public documentation is not evidence of non-availability. Unknown keeps the evidence gap visible.
Yes, as a structured starting point. The linked primary sources, exact plan, region, contracts and deployment configuration still need to be verified.